

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT GREENEVILLE**

KEVIN PARSONS

Plaintiff

v.

EDWARD TESTER,
JOSHUA PETERS,
THOMAS BROWN,
JOSHUA FERGUSON,
EVAN MARTIN,
RAYMOND MINK,
BRADLEY SEXTON,
RYAN ROSIER,

2:19-cv-225

and

JOHNSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE

Defendants

COMPLAINT

The Plaintiff, Kevin Parsons, hereby brings suit against the Defendants as follows:

PARTIES

1) During the events described herein, Plaintiff KEVIN PARSONS, was a citizen of Johnson County, Tennessee. He also was (and still is) the Mayor of its county seat, Mountain City.

2) Defendant EDWARD ("EDDIE") TESTER is the Sheriff of Johnson County. He is

being sued individually.

3) During the events described, Defendants JOSHUA PETERS, THOMAS ("T.J.") BROWN, JOSHUA FERGUSON, EVAN MARTIN, RAYMOND ("R.J.") MINK, and BRADLEY SEXTON were Sheriff's deputies of Johnson County. They are being sued individually.

4) Defendant RYAN ROSIER is an officer with the Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency who routinely works alongside the Johnson County Sheriff's Department for traffic stops and other events.

5) Defendant JOHNSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE is a political subdivision of the state of Tennessee. It is named as a Defendant.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

6) On December 22, 2018, Mayor KEVIN PARSONS was traveling and minding his own business within Johnson County, Tennessee when Sergeant JOSHUA PETERS pulled him over.

7) Prior to this traffic stop, Sergeant PETERS could see that there was a passenger in the car with PARSONS. However, he could not see who the passenger was.

8) The official justification for this traffic stop was that PARSONS was speeding.

9) In reality, the deputy never even measured the car's speed.

10) Instead, he just stopped the car because he wanted to check the driver license of the passenger.

11) Stopping vehicles at random in order to check driver licenses is actually a

common pastime and standard practice of the Johnson County Sheriff's Department.

12) At the beginning of this particular stop, Plaintiff PARSONS was ready to provide his own driver's license. However, it was never even requested. The deputy already knew who he was, anyway, since he was the Mayor of Mountain City.

13) In fact, the deputy pulled him over *because* he recognized him as the Mayor of Mountain City.

14) Instead of asking for information about the driver, PETERS just demanded the driver's license of the *passenger*.

15) In response, the passenger declined to provide any driver's license.

16) Likewise, PARSONS declined to identify his passenger.

17) Sergeant PETERS demanded that this driver identify his passenger.

18) PARSONS still declined. He told the deputy that the government did not have any right to a passenger's information.

19) He then asked if they were free to leave, but the deputy said they were *not* free, until he could identify all occupants of the vehicle.

20) After being denied the freedom to leave, PARSONS phoned the Sheriff himself. He asked Sheriff EDDIE TESTER the legal question at issue: Is a driver required to identify his passenger?

21) Sheriff TESTER is a final policymaker for JOHNSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE.

22) At this point, Sheriff TESTER answered that no, the driver was not required to identify his passenger.

23) Therefore, PARSONS asked if the Sheriff could please educate his deputy on this

legal issue.

24) Sheriff TESTER then spoke to the deputy by phone. After doing so, the Sheriff drove to the scene personally.

25) Instead of setting the deputy straight, though, Sheriff TESTER quickly joined in. He continued to seize the driver and the passenger, and he demanded that PARSONS identify his passenger.

26) Even after the Sheriff arrived, PARSONS still refused to identify his passenger.

27) Altogether, no steps were taken during this "traffic stop" to prosecute any traffic violations.

28) For example, the officer(s) never attempted to examine any insurance paperwork.

29) No one attempted to examine the license of the driver.

30) No one called in a warrants check on the driver.

31) No one ever started writing a traffic ticket.

32) Eventually, the officers revealed to PARSONS that there was a warrant out for his brother-in-law, for unpaid child support. They clarified that they were wondering if the passenger might be this brother-in-law.

33) At the same time that the officers revealed their suspicion, Sergeant PETERS threatened to charge PARSONS with a felony if he did not identify the passenger, if it turned out that the passenger was indeed the brother-in-law.

34) Upon being told of the suspicion, and upon hearing the threat of a felony charge, PARSONS acknowledged that the passenger was indeed his brother-in-law.

35) PETERS and TESTER then arrested the passenger. PARSONS himself was

released, without ever being cited for anything.

36) Unfortunately, Sheriff TESTER had taken office in September 2018, and unbeknownst to PARSONS, during the election season he had made a special promise to his campaign supporters: Once elected Sheriff, he would indict the Mayor of Mountain City.

37) Around the same time that Sheriff TESTER took office, he had knowingly employed a former employee of the Mountain City Police Department.

38) Namely, "T.J." BROWN had formerly worked for the Mountain City Police Department, under Mayor PARSONS. But when the City Council declined to authorize funding for a new drug dog during the fall of 2018, he became disgruntled, accused Mayor PARSONS of trafficking drugs, and quit the force.

39) In response to these unsubstantiated allegations of drug trafficking, on September 10, 2018, PARSONS had filed a complaint against this officer for slander. He had specifically delivered a copy to the officer's new employer — the Sheriff.

40) Sheriff TESTER had ignored the allegation of misconduct against BROWN, and had nonetheless hired, retained, and declined to discipline the new deputy.

41) Two days after that complaint, BROWN had harassed the Plaintiff's daughter at the local high school. In the parking lot, he had run his uncertified drug dog around her vehicle. After doing so, he pretended that this dog had sniffed drugs inside the car. Then he interrogated the girl about these supposed drugs. The interrogation only ended after the assistant principal ordered him off the premises.

42) The Johnson County Sheriff's Department has three drug dogs. None of them are certified as being reliable.

- 43) Still, JOHNSON COUNTY routinely uses these dogs to search people's cars.
- 44) Getting back to the "traffic stop" in question (December 22, 2018), two weeks went by following this stop, without further incident.
- 45) But on January 08, 2019, Deputy PETERS swore out an arrest warrant against PARSONS for his conduct during the stop. The alleged crime was that PARSONS had failed to identify his passenger, and/or had supposedly told the officers, "I don't know," when asked who his passenger was.
- 46) In reality, PARSONS never even said "I don't know," at least not in reference to the passenger's identity. Instead, he just declined to reveal the passenger's name.
- 47) The affidavit of complaint also claimed that PARSONS already knew (prior to the stop) that his brother-in-law had an outstanding warrant.
- 48) This allegation was false or misleading because PARSONS had actually been informed about the outstanding warrant (by PETERS) roughly *seven months* prior. That is, he had known about it once in the past, but the information was completely stale. And during the stop, PARSONS had no reason to suspect that the warrant was still outstanding.
- 49) As listed on the affidavit of complaint, the criminal charge for PARSONS was simply called "Obstruction of Justice." Other than this name, the affidavit merely cited Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602 — a statute which contains more than one chargeable crime.
- 50) "Obstruction of Justice" is not even the name of *any* offense in Tennessee. The charge was simply listed that way in order to smear the Mayor.
- 51) Although the Mayor was no flight risk on this misdemeanor charge, PETERS specifically chose to take out an arrest warrant, instead of a criminal summons. He did so using a

state-law procedure whereby the judicial commissioner had no option but to issue a summons.
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-215(a)(1).

52) Regardless, the judicial commissioner in question also had a policy, which he has admitted, of *always* approving every warrant presented to him by any law enforcement officer. He does not actually judge whether probable cause exists.

53) Further, this judicial commissioner has never, in thirty years, taken a single hour of continuing legal education, even though ten hours of CLE have been required by statute, yearly, since 2010. *See* Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-1-111(f).

54) Nonetheless, JOHNSON COUNTY has continued employing this defective judicial commissioner for decades, paying him out of the county budget.

55) So after getting their "Obstruction of Justice" warrant from this defective judicial commissioner, Deputies JOSHUA PETERS, T.J. BROWN, JOSHUA FERGUSON, EVAN MARTIN, R.J. MINK, BRADLEY SEXTON, and Officer RYAN ROSIER all met together to ambush PARSONS in the parking lot of City Hall.

56) Specifically, they wanted to make a public spectacle by arresting the Mayor, right before a City Council meeting.

57) The officers were wearing full S.W.A.T. gear.

58) They arrested PARSONS just as he was arriving at City Hall to preside over a meeting. They told him that he would not be attending the meeting.

59) The Sheriff did not personally show up to this spectacle, but upon information and belief, he conspired with the other officers to do the deed.

60) During the arrest, the deputies would not tell PARSONS what he was being

arrested for, or show him the warrant.

61) By keeping things ambiguous, the officers thereby added to the mystery and the public spectacle.

62) After PARSONS was handcuffed and locked in a police car, PETERS, BROWN, FERGUSON, MARTIN, MINK, SEXTON, and ROSIER all searched his car.

63) There was no probable cause to think that any evidence was inside.

64) There was no warrant to search the car.

65) The car was searched either to look randomly for drugs, or else to give the *appearance* of suspecting drugs.

66) After the officers had entered the car, they let one of their uncertified drug dogs inside the car to look for drugs.

67) In the process, the beast tore into the inside of the Plaintiff's car, damaging his property.

68) Ultimately, PARSONS spent hours in jail, before making bond.

69) Although the warrant read simply "Obstruction of Justice," at the preliminary hearing, the criminal prosecutor would later clarify that the charge was Obstruction of Service of Process. The crime is a Class B misdemeanor. *See* Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602(c).

70) Over a year before this arrest, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals had already held that Obstruction of Service of Process only occurs if someone commits an "overt act" to prevent service of such civil process. *State v. Burgess*, 532 S.W.3d 372, 391-392 (Tenn. 2017). Under this binding opinion, "mere concealment" of the person to be served was ruled insufficient to charge an offense. *Id.*

71) No overt acts were charged here.

72) In light of the elements of the offense, and especially in light of the appellate court opinion, the affidavit of complaint plainly did not charge any crime against PARSONS.

73) At the preliminary hearing, a special general sessions judge (imported from a different county) reviewed the dashboard video, other evidence, and arguments of the parties. Then he dismissed the charge for lack of probable cause. The dismissal happened on May 29, 2019.

74) All the violation(s) as charged in this complaint were committed intentionally, maliciously, and/or recklessly, warranting the imposition of punitive damages.

75) At all times, these Defendants were acting under color of law, either as a government entity (JOHNSON COUNTY) or as law enforcement officers (everyone else).

76) As a result of the wrongdoing charged herein, PARSONS has suffered humiliation, loss of business income, and emotional distress.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Tester, Peters, and Johnson County)

77) The other sections are incorporated by reference.

78) By stopping the Plaintiff on December 22, 2018 without probable cause, in order to check the identity of his passenger, under color of law Defendants JOSHUA PETERS and EDDIE TESTER violated the Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures.

79) JOHNSON COUNTY is liable for this misconduct because the Sheriff, a final policymaker, personally participated in it.

80) Further, JOHNSON COUNTY is also liable because the Johnson County Sheriff's Department routinely carries out these unlawful stops as a matter of practice.

**COUNT II
FALSE ARREST
42 U.S.C. § 1983**

(All Defendants)

81) The other sections are incorporated by reference.

- 82) By arresting the Plaintiff on January 08, 2019, without probable cause and based on a facially invalid warrant, under color of law Defendants JOSHUA PETERS, T.J. BROWN, JOSHUA FERGUSON, EVAN MARTIN, R.J. MINK, BRADLEY SEXTON, and RYAN ROSIER all violated the Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.

83) Sheriff EDDIE TESTER is also liable for the misconduct because he conspired with PETERS and BROWN to arrest the Plaintiff. The conspiracy is evidenced by his own prior statements pledging to indict the Plaintiff in the absence of probable cause, his ongoing associations with Officer BROWN who had publicly slandered and harassed the Plaintiff, his personal involvement in the illegal roadside encounter by PETERS that was the subject of this warrant, and the two-week delay between that event and the criminal prosecution.

84) JOHNSON COUNTY is liable for this misconduct because the Sheriff, a final

policymaker, personally participated in it through the aforesaid conspiracy.

85) Further, JOHNSON COUNTY is also liable because it employs a defective judicial commissioner who is neither competent, nor neutral and detached, all in deliberate indifference to the rights of the criminally accused within Johnson County.

**COUNT III
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
42 U.S.C. § 1983**

(Tester, Peters, and Johnson County)

86) The other sections are incorporated by reference.

87) Alternatively, by arresting the Plaintiff on January 08, 2019 based on a warrant whose probable cause was procured through his own intentional or reckless falsehoods and misleading statements, Defendant PETERS violated the Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures under color of law.

88) Sheriff TESTER is liable for the misconduct because he conspired with PETERS and BROWN to arrest the Plaintiff. (*See ¶ 83*).

89) JOHNSON COUNTY is also liable for the misconduct because the Sheriff, a final policymaker, participated in it through this conspiracy.

COUNT IV
RETALIATORY ARREST AND PROSECUTION
42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Tester, Peters, and Johnson County)

90) The other sections are incorporated by reference.

91) By arresting and prosecuting the Plaintiff on January 08, 2019 in retaliation for invoking his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and/or for freely telling the officers under the First Amendment that they were behaving wrongly, under color of law Defendant PETERS violated the Fifth and First Amendments.

92) Sheriff TESTER is also liable for the misconduct because he conspired with PETERS and BROWN to arrest the Plaintiff. (*See* ¶ 83).

93) JOHNSON COUNTY is liable for this misconduct because the Sheriff, a final policymaker, personally participated in it.

COUNT V
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
TENNESSEE COMMON LAW

(Tester and Peters)

94) The other sections are incorporated by reference.

95) By maliciously instituting the legal proceeding against the Plaintiff without probable cause, which was later dismissed involuntarily in the Plaintiff's favor, Defendant PETERS committed the common-law tort of malicious prosecution.

96) Sheriff TESTER is also liable for the misconduct because he conspired with PETERS and BROWN to arrest the Plaintiff. (*See* ¶ 83).

COUNT VI
UNREASONABLE SEARCH
42 U.S.C. § 1983

(All Defendants)

97) The other sections are incorporated by reference.

98) By searching the Plaintiff's car on January 08, 2019 without probable cause or any other justification, Defendants PETERS, BROWN, FERGUSON, MARTIN, MINK, SEXTON, and ROSIER all violated the Plaintiff's right under the Fourth Amendment to be free of unlawful searches.

99) Sheriff TESTER is liable for the misconduct because he conspired with PETERS and BROWN, and is therefore liable for all the results of the conspiracy. (*See* ¶ 83).

100) JOHNSON COUNTY is liable for the misconduct because the Sheriff, a final policymaker, participated in it through this conspiracy.

101) JOHNSON COUNTY is also liable because it has a widespread practice of using uncertified drug dogs to search people's cars illegally.

JURISDICTION

102) The federal Court has subject-matter jurisdiction because the civil rights claims listed are based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal question, and the state-law claims are based on the same facts and covered by the Court's supplemental jurisdiction.

103) This Court (in Tennessee) has personal jurisdiction because the Defendants are either citizens of Tennessee, or else have sufficient contacts with Tennessee that traditional

notions of fair play allow for jurisdiction in this state.

104) Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Tennessee (Greeneville Division) because the incidents happened in Johnson County, Tennessee.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Kevin Parsons asks for the following:

- i) Nominal/compensatory damages of \$750,000,
- ii) Punitive damages above that amount,
- iii) Reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and
- iv) Any further relief that the Court deems appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Drew Justice

Drew Justice #29247

Attorney for the Plaintiff

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(615) 419-4994

drew@justicelawoffice.com

CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

KEVIN PARSONS

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Johnson (TN)

(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)

Drew Justice #29247, The Justice Law Office, 1902 Cypress Drive,
Murfreesboro, TN 37130 (615) 419-4994 drew@justicelawoffice.com

DEFENDANTS

EDWARD TESTER, JOSHUA PETERS, THOMAS BROWN, JOSHUA
FERGUSON, EVAN MARTIN, RAYMOND MINK, BRADLEY
SEXTON, RYAN ROSIER, JOHNSON COUNTY TENNESSEECounty of Residence of First Listed Defendant Johnson (TN)

(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF
THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

Attorneys (If Known)

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- ☐ 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff
- ☒ 3 Federal Question
(U.S. Government Not a Party)
- ☐ 2 U.S. Government Defendant
- ☐ 4 Diversity
(Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)

- | | PTF | DEF | | PTF | DEF |
|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Citizen of This State | <input type="checkbox"/> 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> 1 | Incorporated or Principal Place of Business In This State | <input type="checkbox"/> 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> 4 |
| Citizen of Another State | <input type="checkbox"/> 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> 2 | Incorporated and Principal Place of Business In Another State | <input type="checkbox"/> 5 | <input type="checkbox"/> 5 |
| Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country | <input type="checkbox"/> 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> 3 | Foreign Nation | <input type="checkbox"/> 6 | <input type="checkbox"/> 6 |

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

| CONTRACT | TORTS | | FORFEITURE/PENALTY | BANKRUPTCY | OTHER STATUTES |
|---|--|--|---|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 110 Insurance <input type="checkbox"/> 120 Marine <input type="checkbox"/> 130 Miller Act <input type="checkbox"/> 140 Negotiable Instrument <input type="checkbox"/> 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment <input type="checkbox"/> 151 Medicare Act <input type="checkbox"/> 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excludes Veterans) <input type="checkbox"/> 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits <input type="checkbox"/> 160 Stockholders' Suits <input type="checkbox"/> 190 Other Contract <input type="checkbox"/> 195 Contract Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 196 Franchise | PERSONAL INJURY <input type="checkbox"/> 310 Airplane <input type="checkbox"/> 315 Airplane Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 320 Assault, Libel & Slander <input type="checkbox"/> 330 Federal Employers' Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 340 Marine <input type="checkbox"/> 345 Marine Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 350 Motor Vehicle <input type="checkbox"/> 355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 360 Other Personal Injury <input type="checkbox"/> 362 Personal Injury - Medical Malpractice | PERSONAL INJURY <input type="checkbox"/> 365 Personal Injury - Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 367 Health Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY <input type="checkbox"/> 370 Other Fraud <input type="checkbox"/> 371 Truth in Lending <input type="checkbox"/> 380 Other Personal Property Damage <input type="checkbox"/> 385 Property Damage Product Liability | <input type="checkbox"/> 625 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC 881 <input type="checkbox"/> 690 Other LABOR <input type="checkbox"/> 710 Fair Labor Standards Act <input type="checkbox"/> 720 Labor/Management Relations <input type="checkbox"/> 740 Railway Labor Act <input type="checkbox"/> 751 Family and Medical Leave Act <input type="checkbox"/> 790 Other Labor Litigation <input type="checkbox"/> 791 Employee Retirement Income Security Act IMMIGRATION <input type="checkbox"/> 462 Naturalization Application <input type="checkbox"/> 465 Other Immigration Actions | <input type="checkbox"/> 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 <input type="checkbox"/> 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 PROPERTY RIGHTS <input type="checkbox"/> 820 Copyrights <input type="checkbox"/> 830 Patent <input type="checkbox"/> 840 Trademark SOCIAL SECURITY <input type="checkbox"/> 861 HIA (1395ff) <input type="checkbox"/> 862 Black Lung (923) <input type="checkbox"/> 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) <input type="checkbox"/> 864 SSID Title XVI <input type="checkbox"/> 865 RSI (405(g)) FEDERAL TAX SUITS <input type="checkbox"/> 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) <input type="checkbox"/> 871 IRS—Third Party 26 USC 7609 | <input type="checkbox"/> 375 False Claims Act <input type="checkbox"/> 376 Qui Tam (31 USC 3729(a)) <input type="checkbox"/> 400 State Reapportionment <input type="checkbox"/> 410 Antitrust <input type="checkbox"/> 430 Banks and Banking <input type="checkbox"/> 450 Commerce <input type="checkbox"/> 460 Deportation <input type="checkbox"/> 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations <input type="checkbox"/> 480 Consumer Credit <input type="checkbox"/> 490 Cable/Sat TV <input type="checkbox"/> 850 Securities/Commodities/Exchange <input type="checkbox"/> 890 Other Statutory Actions <input type="checkbox"/> 891 Agricultural Acts <input type="checkbox"/> 893 Environmental Matters <input type="checkbox"/> 895 Freedom of Information Act <input type="checkbox"/> 896 Arbitration <input type="checkbox"/> 899 Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision <input type="checkbox"/> 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes |
| REAL PROPERTY <input type="checkbox"/> 210 Land Condemnation <input type="checkbox"/> 220 Foreclosure <input type="checkbox"/> 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment <input type="checkbox"/> 240 Torts to Land <input type="checkbox"/> 245 Tort Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 290 All Other Real Property | CIVIL RIGHTS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 440 Other Civil Rights <input type="checkbox"/> 441 Voting <input type="checkbox"/> 442 Employment <input type="checkbox"/> 443 Housing/Accommodations <input type="checkbox"/> 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - Employment <input type="checkbox"/> 446 Amer. w/Disabilities - Other <input type="checkbox"/> 448 Education | PRISONER PETITIONS Habeas Corpus: <input type="checkbox"/> 463 Alien Detainee <input type="checkbox"/> 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence <input type="checkbox"/> 530 General <input type="checkbox"/> 535 Death Penalty Other: <input type="checkbox"/> 540 Mandamus & Other <input type="checkbox"/> 550 Civil Rights <input type="checkbox"/> 555 Prison Condition <input type="checkbox"/> 560 Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement | | | |

V. ORIGIN (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- ☒ 1 Original Proceeding
- ☐ 2 Removed from State Court
- ☐ 3 Remanded from Appellate Court
- ☐ 4 Reinstated or Reopened
- ☐ 5 Transferred from Another District (specify)
- ☐ 6 Multidistrict Litigation - Transfer
- ☐ 8 Multidistrict Litigation - Direct File

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
42 U.S.C. 1983 (also supplemental jurisdiction)

Brief description of cause:

False Arrest x 2, Malicious Prosecution x 2, Retaliatory Arrest (1st Am. and 5th Am.), Unreasonable Search of Car

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:

☐ CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P.DEMAND \$
750,000.00

CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:

JURY DEMAND: ☐ Yes ☒ No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY

(See instructions):

JUDGE

DOCKET NUMBER

DATE

12/20/2019

SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD

/s/ Drew Justice

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